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Symposium Introduction

Ethics in Settlement Negotiations:
Foreword
by Patrick Emery Longan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 9 and 10, 2001, Mercer University's Walter F. George
School of Law and its Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism held a Symposium on ethical issues in settlement negotiations.
Funding for the Symposium came from a consent order, signed by
United States District Judge Hugh Lawson, in which the DuPont
Corporation settled claims of litigation misconduct in exchange for a
payment of $11 million. Each of the four accredited law schools in
Georgia received $2.5 million to endow a faculty chair in ethics and
* William Augustus Bootle Professor of Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of
Law and Director of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism, Walter F.
George School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (A.B., 1979); University
of Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983).
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professionalism, and the other $1 million was set aside to endow an
annual Symposium on issues of ethics and professionalism. The
Symposium will rotate among Mercer University, the University of
Georgia, Emory University, and Georgia State University. The Mercer
Symposium was the first to be held pursuant to the court's order.
The Symposium examined a draft set of Ethical Guidelines for
Settlement Negotiations being drafted by a task force of the American
Bar Association Section of Litigation.' In recent years, the ABA
Litigation Section has promulgated similar guidelines for litigation
conduct, civil discovery, and trial procedures.2 The success of those
projects led the ABA Litigation Section to undertake the negotiation
project. The task force began studying the issues and drafting the
guidelines in the Spring and Summer of 2000. The ABA Litigation
Section agreed that the Mercer Symposium would provide a type of
"public hearing" for the guidelines in their draft form, as they stood in
March 2001.
The Symposium consisted of panel discussions of the parts of the
guidelines dealing with limits on misleading conduct, conditions in
settlement agreements, and fairness in settlement negotiations.3 The
Symposium concluded with a panel discussion about special issues in
assisted settlement. That topic originally had been part of the draft
guidelines but by March 2001 had been deleted because the task force
decided that the multiple issues that arise in the context of judicial
settlement conferences and mediation deserve separate treatment.

1. Edward M. Waller, Jr. chairs this task force. The reporter for the task force is
Professor Amy Mashburn of the University of Florida, Levin College of Law. The other
task force members are Professor Bruce Green, Professor Burlette Carter, Carol A. Mager,
John Kiernan, Louise LaMothe, Gary Robb, Lorna G. Schofield, Barry S. Alberts, Nicholas
J. Wittner, and Nancy Higgins. United States District Judge Nancy Atlas has also
participated actively in the task force's activities. I wish to express my thanks to all the
members of the task force for their cooperation in connection with the symposium. I
particularly wish to thank Ed Waller and Ronald Jay Cohen, chair of the Section of
Litigation for 2000-2001, without whom the symposium would have been impossible.
2. These standards are all available on the World Wide Web. See <http://www.abanet
.org/litigation/litnews/practice/home.html>.
3. The Guidelines cover other topics as well. These other issues include the purpose
of settlement negotiations, ethical restrictions on disclosure of settlement negotiations, the
division of authority between attorney and client in settlement, the duty to communicate
and advise of settlement offers, and clients with diminished capacity or other special needs.
The Guidelines also cover issues lawyers face with multiple or organizational clients and
with clients holding insured claims. Other issues include special issues in settling class
actions, issues regarding attorney fees, the handling of settlement funds, settlement of
disputes with clients, and court approval of settlement agreements. The symposium
eliminated these topics because of the limited time available.
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Given the number of cases that are settled in these ways, however, the
Symposium would not have been complete without some discussion of
the ethical issues they raise. Each panel included a practicing lawyer,
an academic, and a judge, to ensure that the three, sometimes different,
perspectives of each of these branches of the profession were heard.
With a single exception, the moderators of the panels were members of
the task force. Each panel discussed the issues in the context of
hypothetical situations confronting lawyers or mediators in a negotiation. This Foreword will describe the Guidelines and the hypotheticals
used and will give some background and commentary on the issues they
raise.
One of the preliminary issues with which the task force continues to
wrestle is what form the Guidelines should take. In particular, the task
force has considered whether the Guidelines should describe "best
practices" that suggest lawyers should behave "more ethically" than the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct require or whether the Guidelines
should serve more simply as a handy resource for lawyers who find
themselves with ethical questions in the context of settlement. Another
approach would be to attempt to synthesize what the law is on a
particular subject, taking into account the relevant rules, ethics opinions,
court cases, and other law. This would be the "Restatement" approach.
As you will see, the participants in the Symposium sometimes took
differing views of what the appropriate role for the guidelines might be.
Professor Crystal outlines his thoughts on this subject in his essay in
this volume.4
In the context of settlement negotiations, the question of form is
perhaps a more difficult one than it was when the ABA Litigation
Section produced its guidelines for trial procedure and for discovery. In
each of these cases the rules of procedure failed to give lawyers detailed
guidance with respect to numerous topics. Those earlier guidelines quite
properly attempted to fill those gaps with uniform standards, most of
which were gleaned from case law, local rules, standing orders, and local
customs that were not readily available in one place. With respect to
settlement negotiations, in many respects the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not so much leave gaping holes as they do strike a delicate
and uncomfortable balance among various roles the lawyer must play.
Some fear that guidelines that do anything more than describe that
balance and help attorneys understand what the Model Rules require

4. Nathan M. Crystal, The Incompleteness of the Model Rules and the Development of
Professional Standards, 52 MERCER L. REV. 839 (2001).
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would, in effect, be an inconsistent and confusing "re-write" of the Model
Rules. The Guidelines are still a work in progress as this Article is
written. The final form they will take remains the subject of vigorous
and understandable debate.
II.

LIMITS ON MISLEADING CONDUCT

At the Symposium, the first panel dealt with two issues of truthfulness: misleading statements and the duty to disclose. Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.1 covers these topics:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
There are two issues lurking within and behind this rule. First, as to
misrepresentations, comment two to Rule 4.1 contains a special
qualification for statements in the context of settlement negotiations.5
It exempts from the requirements of Rule 4. 1(a) certain statements that
"[u]nder generally accepted conventions in negotiation" are not taken as
statements of fact, such as the acceptability of a particular amount in
settlement. 6 In other words, there is room in negotiations for puffing
and bluffing because those practices are what everyone involved expects.
Second, the last phrase of Rule 4.1(b) appears to prohibit disclosure,
even to prevent fraud, if Rule 1.6 would prohibit the disclosure. Rule 1.6
forbids disclosure of "information related to the representation of a

5.

This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be
regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally
accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not
taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the
subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of
a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal
except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt. 2 (1999).
6. Id.
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client," absent client consent and with some very limited exceptions.'
The exception, therefore, threatens to swallow the rule about disclosure.
Another relevant Model Rule is Rule 1.16(b), which permits a lawyer
to withdraw from representation if the client "persists in a course of
action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes
is criminal or fraudulent." For example, a client who lies to his or her
lawyer and has the lawyer unwittingly repeat the lie to an opposing
party may forbid the lawyer to reveal the falsity of the representation
already made. The result might be fraud, perpetrated by the client
through the lawyer. The attorney ethically may withdraw from the
representation under these circumstances.
Part 4.1 of the draft Guidelines reiterates the duties that arise under
Rule 4.1 and adds a section that points out the lawyer's duty to
withdraw if the lawyer discovers that the client will use the lawyer's
services to perpetrate a crime of fraud. Guideline 4.3.7 is also relevant:
4.1.1. False Statements of Material Fact. In the course of negotiating or concluding a settlement, a lawyer may not knowingly make a
false statement of material fact (or law) to a third person.
4.1.2. Silence, Omission, and the Duty to Disclose Material Facts.
In the course of negotiating or concluding a settlement, a lawyer must
disclose a material fact to a third person when doing so is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless such
disclosure is prohibited by the ethical duty of confidentiality.
4.1.3. Withdrawal in Situations Involving Misrepresentations of
Material Fact. If a lawyer discovers that a client will use the lawyer's
services or work product to materially further a course of criminal or
fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw from representing the
client and may disaffirm any opinion, document or other affirmation.
If a lawyer discovers that a client has used a lawyer's services in the
past to perpetuate a fraud, now ceased, the lawyer may, but is not

7. Rule 1.6 states in its entirety:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated
in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
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required to, withdraw, but disaffirming his/her prior opinion and work
product is not permitted.
4.3.7. Exploiting Opponent's Mistake. In the settlement context, a
lawyer should not attempt knowingly to obtain benefit or advantage for
himself or herself or his or her client as a result of an opponent's
mistake which has been induced by the lawyer or which is obviously
unintentional. Further, a lawyer may have an affirmative duty to
disclose information in settlement negotiations if he or she knows that
the other side is operating on the basis of a mistaken impression of
material fact.8
Other than Guideline 4.3.7, the relevant Guidelines track the requirements of the Model Rules and provide some commentary and background
in the Reporter's Notes. Guideline 4.3.7 takes other views of the purpose
of the Guidelines. It attempts both to synthesize the lawyer's obligations
from a variety of sources and to describe a "best practices" standard that
may go beyond what is legally required.9
A.

The Limits of Representations

The first panel"0 dealt with these and other issues in the context of
three hypotheticals. The first concerned a case in which the plaintiff
sought lost profits and the lawyer was trying to decide what he or she
could say about the lost profits in negotiation in a variety of factual
situations:
You represent the plaintiff in a breach of contract action. You are
seeking lost profits. What can you say in negotiations about the lost
profits if:
(a) Your expert has come to no conclusion about their cause.
(b) Your expert has told you the breach did not cause the lost profits.
(c) Your expert has given you a range between $2,000,000 and
$5,000,000 for the lost profits.

8. ABA Litigation Section, Ethical Guidelines for Civil Settlement Negotiations (Draft
2001).
9. The Reporter's Notes to Guideline 4.3.7 cite to ethics opinions and refer to state
contract law as part of this "synthesis" approach. They also, however, refer to professionalism guidelines that contain aspirational guidance for lawyers.
10. The moderator for the first panel was Professor Amy Mashburn from the University
of Florida, Levin College of Law. Professor Mashburn is the Reporter to the Task Force
drafting the Guidelines and teaches Professional Responsibility, among other courses. The
practitioner panelist was William Reece Smith, Jr. from Tampa, former president of the
American Bar Association and the International Bar Association and a long-time teacher
of Professional Responsibility at Stetson University College of Law. The judicial panelist
was the Honorable Thomas Zlaket, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Arizona. The
academic panelist was Nathan M. Crystal, Class of 1969 Professor of Professional
Responsibility and Contract Law at the University of South Carolina School of Law.
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(d) Your expert says the maximum lost profit is $2,000,000.
(e) You do not have an expert; your client says the loss was $5,000,000.

It is common in negotiation for each side to emphasize the strength and
persuasiveness of its evidence. On the other hand, each side in discovery
has the opportunity to explore the other side's evidence. In this
scenario, each side would be entitled to a report and a deposition of the
other's testifying expert." Any statement about the expert would be
a statement of fact. Because of the importance of expert testimony to
this case, any statement of this sort would be material. The lawyer
must be careful to tell only the truth to avoid violating Rule 4.1. Good
lawyers, however, will test the assertions in discovery,
consistent with
12
the now-famous Russian proverb, "Trust, but verify."
Beyond the rules of ethics, however, it is proper to ask what the best
strategy is for a lawyer in this negotiation. Here, any statement about
the expert's conclusions probably will be the subject of discovery. If the
statement is found to be false, the lawyer who made it will lose some
credibility. That loss, which will likely survive the conclusion of this.
particular case and affect negotiations with the other lawyer in future
cases, will cause these future negotiations to be more strained, more
lengthy, and probably less fruitful. To the extent that the lawyer gains
a reputation for untruthfulness as a result of statements about the
expert, the lawyer may be impeding all his or her future negotiations.
In other words, this hypothetical involves a happy situation in which it
is both the right strategy and the smart strategy to tell the truth.
In a continuation of that same hypothetical, the panel discussed
questions of representations about settlement authority and statements
of fact that are literally true but, in context, potentially misleading:
In this breach of contract action, can you:
(a) tell opposing counsel that you will not settle for less than $3.5
million when you have authority to settle for $ 2 million?
(b) tell opposing counsel that five major buyers stopped buying from
your client after the breach, knowing that they stopped buying for
other reasons?

As discussed, comment 2 to Model Rule 1.4 defines statements about
settlement authority not to be material. Technically, therefore, the
lawyer should feel free to lie about his or her authority. Another

11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (expert report) and 26(b)(4)(A) (expert deposition).
12. President Reagan made this proverb famous in connection with his negotiations
with Mikhail Gorbachev. President Gorbachev once told him at a press conference, "You

repeat that at every meeting." President Reagan replied, "I like it." Ronald Reagan, The
Many Lives (A & E Biography) (videotape).
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strategy, however, and one that may be more effective in the long run,
is simply to deflect any questions of authority with statements such as,
"You know neither one of us can discuss our authority-let's talk about
a fair settlement of this case."'" The reason a deflection may be more
effective in the long run is the same reason exaggerations about the.
expert's conclusions may cause long term harm. You may be ethically
permitted to lie about your authority, but if you do it, and the other
lawyer catches you at it, he or she will not trust you again.
The misleading statement about the lost customers raises a persistent
and subtle issue for lawyers about the use of language. The statement
is literally true. These customers have left, and they did so at a time
after the defendant's breach. The only reason the statement is made,
however, is in the hope that the defendant will make the leap and
conclude that the customers left because of the breach or, at least, that
the plaintiff will attempt to prove that they did. The statement is,
therefore, an intentionally misleading, sly use of language. It is
reminiscent of former President Clinton's response to a question before
the grand jury about his deposition testimony: "It depends on what the
meaning of is is."14 The lawyer who engages in this type of deception
is more clever, perhaps, than a straightforward liar, but the lawyer is no
less worthy of condemnation. Once again, however, we can rely on the
power of reputation to deter lawyers (at least those who care about their
reputations) from engaging in these tactics. Word gets around.
B.

Disclosure of Factual Errors

The second hypothetical concerned a duty to disclose facts when the
other lawyer has made a settlement offer containing obvious mistakes:
You represent the husband in a divorce action. You receive from
opposing counsel a proposed property settlement with the following
errors: (1) a transcription error that undervalues an asset; (2) an
arithmetical error that undervalues an asset; (3) a valuation by
purchase price of an asset when market value is much higher. All the
errors work to your client's advantage. What, if anything, should you
do about them?
To the extent that the first two errors are "scrivener's errors" (the other
lawyer missed a typographical error or failed to add the numbers

13. See NATHAN CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND
THE PROFESSION 412 (2000) ("such questions can easily be deflected").
14. See SUSAN SCHMIDT & MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, TRUTH AT ANY COST: KEN STARR AND
THE UNMAKING OF BILL CLINTON 238-39 (2001) (discussing the context of the former
President's testimony).
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correctly), the lawyer has the duty to correct the mistakes.15 The third
problem may raise more difficult issues because the error may come from
opposing counsel's conscious but erroneous judgment about what
valuation is best for his or her client. Can the lawyer in the hypothetical take advantage of his or her adversary's error in judgment?
The question is a species of a fundamental, recurring question in an
adversarial system. 6 The lawyer owes a primary duty of loyalty to the
client. In most respects, the lawyer is not expected to be his or her
brother's keeper. One answer to the particular ethical question
presented is to say that it is not the interesting or important question.
The client is not perpetrating a fraud or a crime by taking advantage of
a bad lawyer on the other side. There is no duty to disclose under Rule
4.1.
Abiding by the rules of ethics, however, is necessary but not always
sufficient for good lawyering. Ethically, the lawyer need not correct
every misstep of opposing counsel. But sometimes correcting the
mistake would be the wise thing to do. For example, if the mistakes
involved in the proposal were fundamental mistakes, ones that under
the law of contract the opposing party would provide grounds later to
void the transaction,17 then the lawyer may best serve his or her client
by alerting opposing counsel to the mistakes now. If the parties to the
transaction will have a continuing relationship, such as shared
responsibility for minor children, the best strategy might be to correct
the mistakes and buy some trust, which may be sorely needed later.
Here, as in many situations, ethics tells you the options available, but
the lawyer must still exercise good judgment among the options.
C. Disclosure of Legal Errors
The final hypothetical for the first panel highlighted the fact that
Model Rule 4.1 forbids a lawyer from making a material misrepresentation about the law. The hypothetical does so in the context of an
interaction with a young lawyer who is operating under a mistake about
the state of the law:
You represent the defendant in a personal injury case. In negotiation
with plaintiff's counsel (a young, relatively inexperienced lawyer), it
becomes clear to you that this lawyer believes his or her client's

15. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1518 (1986).
16. The welcoming address to my law school class in 1980 at the University of Chicago
was given by Floyd Abrams. The one thing I remember from that speech was, "You will
be surprised in your practice the number of times you will rely upon the incompetence of
opposing counsel."
17.

See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 306-08 (2d ed. 1977).
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potential recovery is limited by a tort reform statute. You know that
this statute has been found unconstitutional by the state supreme
court. May you, and should you, correct opposing counsel's mistake
about the law?
Most practicing lawyers would not think twice about taking advantage
of this younger lawyer. Again, the client is not perpetrating a fraud or
a crime, and the client might be very happy to save some money because
his or her adversary's lawyer is clueless. No rule of legal ethics requires
the lawyer to be the opposing party's lawyer also. No rule requires that
lawyers settle cases only on "fair" terms.
Again, however, the strictly ethical inquiry cannot end the discussion.
For example, lawyers might find that taking advantage of the mistake
in particular circumstances, such as a horrific injury to a young child,
would be morally wrong although ethically permissible. The lawyer is
free to counsel the client about nonlegal matters, such as the morality
of leaving the injured child unable to obtain the life-long care the child
needs.' s The lawyer is even free to seek to withdraw if assisting in a
settlement under these circumstances would be repugnant to the
lawyer. 9 Here, as in the prior examples, the best lawyers consider all
the circumstances and determine first whether the rules of ethics require
a particular course of action and, if they do not, what under all the
circumstances is the wisest choice.

III.

CONDITIONS IN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

The second session of the Symposium concerned limits on what
attorneys can include in their settlement agreements. The Symposium
dealt with four types of conditions parties can attempt to impose: (1) a
restriction on one attorney's right to practice law; (2) an agreement to
waive an attorney's claim for fees; (3) an agreement to destroy or return
evidence obtained in discovery; and (4) an agreement not to report
professional misconduct in exchange for a civil settlement.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct deal directly or indirectly
with each of these issues. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6(b)
forbids "an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to
practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private
parties." With respect to attorney fees and settlement, a proposal that

18. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 states in relevant part, "In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."
19. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(b) states in relevant part, "[A] lawyer may
withdraw from representing a client if... a client insists upon pursuing an objective that
the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent."
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asks the lawyer to waive a claim for attorney fees to facilitate a client's
settlement raises a potential conflict of interest. Rule 1.7 imposes limits
on a lawyer's ability to represent a client if the representation might be
affected by the lawyer's own interests. 20 Agreements about evidence
fall under Rule 3.4, under which an advocate is not permitted to
"unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value," or to counsel or to assist another in doing so.
Finally, the Model Rules require lawyers to report another lawyer's
professional misconduct if it "raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects."2'
The Guidelines reinforce counsel's duties under the Model Rules. They
also add some detail that is missing from the Rules and official
comments:
4.2.1. Conditioning Settlement on Restricting Opposing Lawyer's Right
to Practice or Consult. A lawyer may not offer or accept a settlement
conditioned on an agreement that directly or indirectly precludes the
lawyer for one party from representing clients in future litigation
against the opposing party.
4.2.2. Conditioning Settlement on Agreement Respecting Attorney's
Fees. In any circumstance where the negotiation of a settlement may
include negotiation of a proposed fee for the attorney for the prevailing
party, the lawyer seeking payment of a fee may not subordinate the
client's interest in a favorable settlement to the lawyer's interest in the
case.
4.2.3. Conditioning Settlement On Agreement Not to Report Opposing
Counsel's Misconduct. An attorney may not condition settlement on an
agreement not to report opposing counsel's misconduct.
4.2.4. Conditioning Settlement on Return or Destruction of Tangible
Evidence. Unless otherwise unlawful, a lawyer may ethically solicit
and enter into an agreement, as part of a settlement, that counsel will
return or dispose of all documents produced in discovery.
4.2.6. Agreement to Keep Settlement Terms and Other Information
Confidential. In general, a lawyer may ethically negotiate and agree
to be bound by an agreement that lawyer and the client will keep
settlement terms and other information relating to the litigation
confidential.

20. Model Rule 1.7(b) states in relevant part, "A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client may be materially limited ... by the lawyer's own
interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation."
21. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1999).
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The Guidelines in 4.2 are a mixture of reminders of the Model Rules and
interpretations of the Rules for the particular context of settlement.
Guideline 4.2.1 reiterates Rule 5.6's prohibition on settlement agreements that restrict a lawyer's right to practice, while 4.2.6 interprets
that rule usually to permit confidentiality clauses. Guideline 4.2.2
interprets the conflict of interest rules to require an attorney to
subordinate his or her interest in a fee to the client's interest in
settlement. Guideline 4.2.4 interprets Rule 3.4 usually to permit
settlements that require the return or destruction of evidence. Guideline
4.2.3 sets forth the way in which the ABA has interpreted Model Rule
8.3(a)'s requirements on reporting professional misconduct in the context
of settlement negotiations.
A. Agreements Restricting a Lawyer's Right to Practiceand
ConcerningAttorney Fees
The second panel22 discussed these issues in the context of three
hypotheticals. The first raised issues of both restrictions to practice and
attorney fees:
You represent the plaintiff in an antitrust case. The defendant offers
to settle the case on three conditions: (1) the negotiations and the
amount of the settlement will remain confidential and neither you nor
your client may use this information in any way in the future; (2)your
firm will waive any claim for attorney fees under the antitrust statutes;
(3) thirty days after the settlement, your firm will receive a general
retainer of one million dollars from the defendant and thereafter act as
the defendant's "litigation prevention counsel." May you, and should
you, accept any of these conditions?
The first two of these issues require some analysis, while the third
presents a clear violation of the Model Rules.
An agreement to keep settlement terms confidential is common. It
promotes settlement because the defendant can avoid the publicity
surrounding a large settlement and can hope thereby to avoid provoking
more plaintiffs to sue. The self-interested plaintiff probably cares about
little but the amount of the check and will gladly sell his or her silence.

22. The moderator for this panel was Bruce Green, the Louis Stein Professor of Law
at Fordham Law School and Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics. The
practitioner panelist was Evett Simmons, the current President of the National Bar
Association. The Honorable Marvin Aspen, Chief Judge of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, was the judicial panelist. The designated academic
was C. Ronald Ellington, the A. Gus Cleveland Professor of Legal Ethics and Professionalism at the University of Georgia School of Law.
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The subtlety here is the effect of this agreement on the lawyer. The
lawyer may not indirectly agree as part of a settlement not to represent
others against this same defendant. Yet this proposed settlement
agreement purports to forbid the lawyer from using the amount of the
settlement, or information about the negotiations themselves, for any
future clients. The lawyer presumably cannot forget what just happened
and presumably could not help but use the experience in future litigation
against this defendant. 23 Note that Guideline 4.2.5 uses the introductory phrase "in general." The Reporter's Notes quite properly make clear
that this qualification means restrictions on the use of information are
not permissible if they go so far as to constitute a restriction on the right
to practice law, in violation of Model Rule 5.6.
The second issue is the proposal to settle the case if the claim for
attorney fees is waived. Clients and their lawyers are in conflict if more
money for one means less money for the other. Here, the lawyer is
asked to sacrifice for the client's recovery. Sometimes, especially in class
actions, lawyers may sacrifice their clients in order to obtain a higher
fee. 4 The Guidelines require the lawyer to subordinate his or her
interest. That conclusion is not in the text of Model Rule 1.7(b) but
flows logically from it. The lawyer can only continue as lawyer if the
lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely
affected by the lawyer's own interests. The client comes first. One
suggestion from the Reporter's Notes to the Guidelines is to try to deal
with this problem when the lawyer is first retained, such as by
assignment to the lawyer of the client's right to collect statutory attorney
fees. If the lawyer chooses this route, he or she must also consider Rule
1.8(a), which imposes limits on an attorney's transactions with a
client.2"

23. It is only in the movies that immediate and narrowly defined memory loss can be
induced. In Men In Black, Tommy Lee Jones and Will Smith used a device known as the
"flashy thing" to erase memories of alien sitings from those who were not supposed to see
them. Until the flashy thing becomes a reality, we cannot expect lawyers to erase their
memories of their experience with aliens, or defendants.
24. This criticism was a common reaction to the settlement of one of the class actions
against General Motors involving "side-saddle" gas tanks on trucks. In one famous
settlement, the lawyers were to receive from GM $9.5 million in fees while members of the
class received coupons worth a discount off the purchase of their next GM truck. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit invalidated the settlement. In re
General Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. GMC v. French, 516 U.S. 824 (1995).
25. Model Rule 1.8(a) states in relevant part,
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client ... unless: (1)
the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
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The final part of this hypothetical should be the easiest. Model Rule
5.6 and Guideline 4.2.1 forbid agreements that restrict the lawyer's right
to represent future clients against the settling party. The rule both
protects the supply of lawyers available for those future parties and
keeps the lawyer from selling out the current client by negotiating a
lucrative "consulting agreement" with the client's adversary. This
problem seems simple enough. The reason it is worth discussion is that
lawyers in high profile cases continue to violate the rule. It was recently
reported that lawyers in Florida settled a case against the DuPont
Corporation in part by accepting a secret $6.4 million "consultation"
contract with DuPont.2" The lesson, perhaps, is that temptation and
sin never go out of style, nor does the need to preach against them.
B.

Agreements That Suppress Evidence

The second hypothetical on- conditions in settlement agreements
concerned the return of documents produced in litigation:
You represent the plaintiff in a product liability action. In discovery,
you receive a document marked "privileged and confidential" detailing
a study by the defendant of the product in question. The study
concludes that the product is dangerous. No privilege appears to apply
to this document. When the defendant realizes that you have the
document, the defense lawyer offers to settle the case conditioned on
the return of the study and a confidentiality clause. The lawyer claims
the study was produced "inadvertently" and makes it clear that the
document will not be produced in any similar litigation. The product
is still on the market. May you, and should you, settle on this basis?
Parties, especially defendants, frequently settle because damaging and
perhaps embarrassing evidence has emerged in discovery. Agreements
to return or destroy discovery material as part of a settlement are
commonplace. The Guidelines provide that they are permissible, unless
they are "otherwise unlawful." When would it be unlawful?
One possibility comes from Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(a),
which states that a lawyer shall not "unlawfully obstruct another
party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value," or
counsel or assist another in doing so. In this hypothetical, similar
litigation is at least a possibility and might already have been filed. As

client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client; (2) the client

is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the
transaction; and (3) the client consents in writing thereto.
26. Ann Woolner, Dealing With DuPont, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Feb. 22, 2001.
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described, the document has evidentiary value to those cases, and the
defense lawyer has made the plaintiff's lawyer aware that the document
"will not be produced" in any similar litigation. That statement could
mean that the defendant will inform other plaintiffs about the existence
of the document but resist production. 27 Returning the document would
be innocent enough in that case. However, if the defense lawyer makes
it clear that the document will be destroyed, the plaintiff's lawyer has
a problem. To return the document with that knowledge might be to
"assist" another to conceal or destroy evidence. The plaintiff's lawyer
perhaps should insist on a written representation from the defense
lawyer that the document will not be concealed from future plaintiffs or
destroyed. Another risk is that the destruction will violate state law.
In Texas, some discovery material is a "public record" unless the court
specifically exempts it, so to destroy the document might land the
plaintiff's lawyer in serious trouble.2"
Another concern is that the product is still on the market. The lawyer
has just seen evidence that the product is dangerous, and it seems clear
that the defendant does not intend to do anything about the danger.
The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission considered but rejected a proposed
rule that would have forbidden lawyers to enter into secret settlements
that jeopardize public health or safety.29 Even if the return of the
documents is lawful and even though the attorney's action may be
"ethical" under the Model Rules, the lawyer may have to ask whether it
is the right thing to do. Is the service to your client here the highest
duty? Or should the lawyer consider the harm to others that could be
prevented if the evidence came to light? At least, the lawyer can and
should counsel the client about this aspect of the settlement decision.3 °
The lawyer may even have to consider withdrawal if the product is so
dangerous that the lawyer finds participating in the settlement to be
repugnant.31

27. See FED. R. Cir. P. 26(b)(5) (stating documents withheld on the basis of privilege

must be identified and described).
28. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a. The definition of public record includes "discovery, not filed of
record, concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect upon the general public

health or safety, or the administration of public office, or the operation of government,
except discovery in cases originally initiated to preserve bona fide trade secrets or other
intangible property rights."
29. See Mark Hansen, And Now the Feedback, 87 A.B.A. J. 88 (April 2001).
30. Recall that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 states in relevant part, "In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."
31. Model Rule 1.16(b) ("[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if... a
client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or
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C. Agreements Not to Report Misconduct
Finally, this panel discussed whether a lawyer can settle a case in
exchange for not reporting professional misconduct:
You represent the defendant in an employment discrimination action.
The judge sends the case to mediation. In mediation, it becomes clear
that the plaintiff's lawyer is handling the case despite a conflict of
interest. The mediator threatens to reveal the conflict to the court.
The plaintiff's lawyer offers to settle the case on favorable terms,
provided that the conflict of interest will not be reported to anyone.
Your client instructs you to accept the offer. May you, and should you,
settle on this basis?
The Guidelines state flatly that the lawyer may not condition a
settlement on an agreement not to report opposing counsel's misconduct.
Model Rule 8.3(a) requires a lawyer with knowledge of another
lawyer's serious misconduct (misconduct that "raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects") to report that misconduct to disciplinary
authorities. For the other lawyer to continue to represent a client
despite a conflict of interest at least reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice and appears also to be dishonest because the lawyer wants to
keep the conflict a secret. However, the conclusion that the settlement
cannot proceed on this basis is not inevitable under the text of the Rules
and the official comments. Model Rule 8.3(c) states that subsection (a)
"does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6." Comment 2 to the Rule reiterates this limitation but states that "a
lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where
prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interest." But
what if the client refuses to permit the lawyer to report? It is within the
client's rights, apparently, to do so, and under those facts perhaps the
lawyer could decide the settlement should go forward.
The ABA has interpreted the Rule differently, however. In Formal
Opinion 94-383, the ABA concluded that a lawyer could not use a threat
of reporting a disciplinary violation in a negotiation. 32 As a corollary,
the ABA found that an agreement not to report as part of a settlement
would violate Rule 8.3(a)'s mandatory reporting requirement. 3 The
irony of this conclusion is that the agreement cannot be made on the
basis that the report will be withheld, but unless the client consents to

imprudent.").
32. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 383 (1994).
33. Id.
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the report, the lawyer cannot make it anyway. The ABA's interpretation, however, at least removes a major incentive for the client to
withhold consent, and to that extent the interpretation promotes the
purposes behind Rule 8.3(a).
There is another reason why the lawyer in this hypothetical would not
want to agree to keep the conflict a secret. A more direct interest is at
stake in this case than the abstract protection of the public. The
plaintiff's lawyer has a client who is being kept in the dark and who
almost certainly is being sold out by a lawyer who wants to keep his or
her violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct from becoming known.
The lawyer who agrees to this condition in settlement may be making
himself or herself and his or her client a party to a fraud on the other
lawyer's client. Under Rule 1.2(d), the lawyer cannot assist his or her
client in the fraud, even in exchange for a handsome settlement.
IV.

FAIRNESS IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

The third discussion of the Guidelines focused on issues that are
loosely described as "fairness" issues. Grouped under this heading are
concerns about misusing the settlement process, overreaching with other
lawyers' clients or an unrepresented party, making improper threats,
and using confidential information that has been obtained improperly.
The Model Rules deal with most of these issues, although sometimes
only indirectly. Model Rule 4.4 forbids a lawyer from using means (not
just in settlement, but generally) that "have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person." Rule 4.2 prohibits
lawyers from contacting another lawyer's client without permission.34
Rule 4.3 contains protections for unrepresented persons and requires
lawyers to correct any misunderstanding with these persons about their
role. Rule 4.3 also forbids lawyers from stating or implying in this
situation that they are disinterested.3" Comment one to that rule
states that lawyers should not give advice to unrepresented persons
except the advice to obtain counsel. 6 The Model Rules do not contain

34. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 states in its entirety: "In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a
person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
35. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.3 states:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel,
a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person
misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
36.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 cmt. 1 (1999).
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a provision about improper threats although ABA Formal Opinions have
been issued about threats of criminal prosecution and disciplinary action
in civil matters.3 7 Finally, the use of improperly acquired information
is addressed by both a Model Rule and a formal opinion. Rule 4.4
forbids a lawyer from using methods to obtain evidence that violate the
ABA Formal Opinion 94-383 instructs
rights of third persons."
lawyers to notify opposing counsel if they receive confidential information.39
The Guidelines in Part 4.3 are a mixture of reiterations of the Model
Rules and limits taken from the comments and ABA Formal Opinions:
4.3.1. Bad Faith in the Settlement Process. An attorney may not
employ the settlement process in bad faith.
4.3.2. Duress and Extortionate Tactics in Negotiations. A lawyer may
not employ pressure tactics in negotiating a settlement that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden the opposing
party.
4.3.2.1. A lawyer may not threaten to report an opposing party with
criminal prosecution in connection with settlement negotiations except
in limited circumstances where the criminal and civil matters are
related, the criminal charge is warranted by the law and facts, the
lawyer does not try to influence the criminal process, and such threat
is not otherwise prohibited by applicable substantive law.
4.3.2.2. A lawyer may agree to refrain from pressing criminal charges
as part of a settlement of a client's civil claim unless prohibited by
applicable substantive law.
4.3.2.3. If opposing counsel's misconduct raises a substantial question
of that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, a
lawyer cannot agree to forbear to report such misconduct to appropriate disciplinary authorities, and it is improper to use the threat of
reporting such misconduct as a bargaining chip in settlement negotiations.
4.3.3. A lawyer shall not communicate about a settlement with a
person the lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer in the lawsuit.
4.3.4. In negotiating a settlement with an opposing party who is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer should clearly identify himself or
herself as the lawyer for the other party, cannot state or imply that he
or she is disinterested, and must make reasonable efforts to correct any
misunderstanding about his or her role in the matter; cannot give

37. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 363 (1992),
(threats of criminal prosecution); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 383 (1994) (threats of disciplinary action).
38.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4.

39. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 383 (1994).
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advice other than advice to obtain counsel; and cannot make inaccurate
or misleading statements of law or material fact.
In the context of a series of hypotheticals involving a class action, the
third panel4 ° discussed these Guidelines, and the Rules, comments, and
opinions from which they come.
A.

Dealing With an UnrepresentedParty

The first part of this hypothetical raised questions about dealing with
members of a putative class:
You represent the defendant in a product liability class action. The
plaintiff is seeking class action certification but has not yet received it.
You believe that you can settle the claims of many potential members
of the class if you can negotiate with them directly. May you make
settlement offers directly to them? May you emphasize to them that
the cost of litigating their individual claims would be far greater than
what they could hope to recover?
The issues are whether any contact is appropriate and, if it is, what the
lawyer can and cannot say.
The lawyer must first ensure that the court has not restricted direct
contact. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that district
courts can restrict communications with members of a putative class if
the order is based upon a clear record and specific findings that the
restrictions are necessary.41 If the court has not restricted communications, the defense lawyer faces another issue. If the class counsel
represents the members of the putative class for purposes of Rule 4.2,
then the defense lawyer may not contact them directly. There is no
consensus whether Rule 4.2 bars this sort of contact. 42 At least one
federal court prohibits contact with class members without court

40. The moderator for this panel was Edward M. Waller, chairman of the Business
Litigation Department of the Fowler White firm in Tampa, Florida and chairman of the
ABA Litigation Section special committee on ethics in settlement negotiations. The
practitioner panelist was Nancy Scott Degan, a partner in the Phelps Dunbar firm in New
Orleans and Co-Director of Division V of the ABA Litigation Section. The judge was the
Honorable Mary Scriven, United States Magistrate Judge for the Middle District of Florida.
The academic representative was Professor James Moliterno, Professor of Law, Director
of the Legal Skills Program, and Director of the Center for the Teaching of Legal Ethics
at the College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
41. Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1981).
42.

See, e.g., ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K. M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER

MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 416-17 (1999).
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permission while a class certification motion is pending.4 3 The wise
lawyer will check his or her local listings before picking up the phone.
If the contact is permitted, the lawyer must be wary of Model Rule
4.3's limits on what should be said and of Rule 4.1's prohibition on
misleading statements of law or fact. Guideline 4.3.4 synthesizes these
Rules and the Comment to Rule 4.3. The lawyer first must make it clear
to this unrepresented person that he or she represents another party
and is not disinterested. Second, the lawyer must tell the truth. In the
hypothetical, the lawyer wants to tell the putative class members that
the cost of litigating their individual claims would be far greater than
litigating their claims alone. That statement in many small-stakes class
actions would be true while it might be untrue in a mass tort class
action. The statement also slyly implies that an individual action is the
alternative to a settlement even though the lawyer knows a class action
is pending. A person who settled and then learned of the class action
might justifiably feel deceived. Third, the statement comes close to therendering of legal advice. The unstated conclusion is that, because of
the small stakes, the person ought to settle now. The lawyer may be
better off simply extending an offer and suggesting that the person seek
the advice of a disinterested lawyer. Only in this way can the lawyer
avoid the traps of making a statement that looks later to a judge like a
misrepresentation or inappropriate legal advice.
B.

Threats in Negotiations
The second hypothetical raises issues about documents that are sent
to a lawyer improperly and the use the lawyer can or should make of
them:
Suppose the court certifies a class. During discovery, you receive an
unsolicited letter from a former paralegal for the plaintiffs' law firm.

The letter encloses a standard set of instructions for the plaintiffs'
witnesses. The instructions arguably advise the witnesses to lie under
oath about their exposure to the defendant's product. May you use the
instructions in settlement negotiations? May you use the threat of a
bar disciplinary proceeding or a criminal prosecution for obstruction of
justice? In exchange for a favorable settlement, may you agree not to
report the instructions the plaintiffs' lawyers had been giving?
This hypothetical is based, loosely, on a case involving plaintiffs in a set
of asbestos cases in Texas. The law firm of Baron & Budd was accused

43. Local Rule 4.04(e), United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
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of improperly coaching witnesses about the sources of their exposure to
asbestos."
The lawyer who receives these instructions faces three issues. The
first is what to do with the materials given that they are obviously
confidential documents from opposing counsel's office. The ABA has
stated in a Formal Opinion that the lawyer first should refrain from
viewing them or review them enough to decide how to proceed.45 Here
the lawyer will not know they are confidential unless he or she reads
them, so these documents at least will be reviewed. The ABA Formal
Opinion then requires the lawyer to notify the other lawyer and await
instructions on what to do.4" The ABA task force on ethics in settlement negotiations currently plans to track this language."'
The receiving lawyer in this case, therefore, is supposed to notify the
plaintiff's lawyer and await the inevitable instruction to return the
documents. But then the second issue arises. The documents have
revealed conduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. May
the lawyer threaten to report the misconduct in order to induce a
settlement? The answer appears to be no. As discussed above, in
Formal Opinion 94-383, the ABA concluded that the lawyer is "constrained" from using this sort of threat by the mandatory obligation to
report the other lawyer's professional misconduct. The ABA Guidelines
on Settlement Negotiations incorporate this conclusion into Guideline
4.3.2.3.
The final issue is whether the lawyer can use the threat of a criminal
referral in the settlement negotiations.
The confidential witness
instructions may be evidence of obstruction of justice. The Model Rules
of Professional Conduct do not contain a prohibition on using a threat of
criminal prosecution to settle a civil claim. However, the ABA has
issued a formal opinion in which the lawyer's ability to use these threats
is limited to situations in which the criminal and civil matters are

44. See Bob Van Noris, Client Memo Embarrasses Dallas Firm, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 13,
1997.
45. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992).
46. Id. The opinion also gives the receiving lawyer the option to hold the documents
pending a court resolution of what should be done with them. That option is available,
however, only when there is a legitimate dispute about the receiving lawyer's entitlement

to the documents, such as when the documents in question perhaps should have been
produced in discovery. That route would not be available to the receiving lawyer in this
case.
47. Draft Guideline 4.3.6, Improper Acquisition or Use of Opposing Parties'
Information, currently reads: "If the lawyer knows or should know that info was
inadvertently sent ... [the rest of this guideline will track the language of the proposed
model rule or ABA opinion]."
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related, the criminal charge is warranted on the facts and the law, the
lawyer does not try to influence the criminal process, and the threat is
not otherwise unlawful.4" In this situation, one issue would be whether
the civil and criminal matters are "related" because the criminal activity
arose in connection with the litigation and not the underlying facts of
the case. The ABA Formal Opinion requires a relationship between the
"facts or transaction" of the underlying civil claim and the criminal
activity before a threat of criminal prosecution is permissible.4 9 A
threat that concerns other activity, such as the way in which the lawyer
conducts the litigation, would be improper. Furthermore, the Formal
Opinion states that it does not intend to override the lawyer's affirmative duty to report professional misconduct.5 ° Where, as here, the
professional misconduct and the criminal activity are the same, the duty
to report apparently trumps any otherwise proper agreement not to
pursue the matter. For both of these reasons, in this case the lawyer
should not use the threat of criminal prosecution for obstruction of
justice as a way of settling the civil case.
C. Good Faith in Negotiations
The next hypothetical raises a basic question about when and why the
lawyer can engage in negotiations:
You choose not to use the plaintiffs' lawyer's instructions in an attempt
to settle. In fact, your client has instructed you not to settle this case
at all, ever, or even to negotiate. Your client believes any negotiation
would be seen as a sign of weakness. You recognize, however, that a
complete refusal to negotiate would irritate the magistrate judge
assigned to the case. You also realize that you might be able to learn
something about how the plaintiffs intend to prove damages if you
engage them in negotiations. Your client would also be pleased if
negotiations protracted the proceedings. What advice would you give
your client about its current settlement posture?
Guideline 4.3.1 states that an attorney "may not employ the settlement
process in bad faith." Model Rule 4.4 prohibits a lawyer from using
means that only "embarrass, delay, or burden" a third person. What
advice should the lawyer give when the client wants to use negotiation
to curry favor with the judge, to conduct some informal discovery, and
to delay the case?

48. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 363 (1992).
49. Id.

50. Id.
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One part of the advice would have to be that the lawyer will not
negotiate just as a delaying tactic. That means of delay would be a
straightforward violation of Rule 4.4. The lawyer should also give the
practical advice that the magistrate judge likely will be even more
irritated by sham negotiations than by an open refusal to settle. The
best advice in this situation, however, would be to advise the client that
it should authorize the lawyer to engage in negotiations for the purpose
of finding out if an acceptable settlement can be reached. No matter
how firmly the client believes that it should not settle, it is short-sighted
to act on that belief until the lawyer finds out what the other side may
have in mind. With authority to engage in real negotiations, the lawyer
can proceed without fear of any allegation of bad faith.
D.

Dealing With a Represented Party

Finally, our defense lawyer faces some issues regarding a client who
is represented by a lawyer:
Your client is sued by one plaintiff who opted out of the class action.
You have made a settlement offer to the plaintiff's counsel, but based
upon your prior experience with this lawyer you have reason to believe
that his or her client has not been informed about the offer. What
should you do? In particular, should you send the client a proposed
settlement agreement with a copy to the lawyer? Should you have
your client contact the plaintiff directly and communicate the offer?
What should you do if the plaintiff calls to ask questions about the
agreement? What if the plaintiff says he has fired his or her lawyer
and wants to accept the offer?
Model Rule 4.2 and Guideline 4.3.4 prohibit the lawyer from contacting
a represented party. The offer should go to the opposing lawyer, who is
obligated to convey it to his or her client."' But what if the lawyer,
through incompetence or a mistaken view of his or her authority, is
refusing to pass the offer along?
The ABA has concluded that the lawyer has only one option in this
situation: to have his or her client communicate directly with the other
client and convey the offer.52 The purpose of the prohibition on
contacting another lawyer's client is to prevent overreaching. By having
the client rather than the lawyer make the contact, the hope is that the
information can be conveyed without the risk of the lawyer taking
advantage of the other party. Once the offer is conveyed, the lawyer

51. Under Rule 1.4, comment 1, the lawyer is obligated to convey any settlement offer
unless the client has made it clear beforehand that the offer is unacceptable.

52. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 362 (1992).
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must be careful not to respond to inquiries from the represented party
about the proposal, but the lawyer should refer all questions to the other
lawyer. If the other party states that the lawyer has been fired, that
fact should be confirmed, preferably in writing from the lawyer
concerned. Without that assurance, the lawyer must proceed as if the
other lawyer's representation is continuing.
V.

SPECIAL ISSUES OF ASSISTED SETTLEMENT

Many settlement negotiations occur in the contexts of judicial
settlement conferences and mediation. Special ethical issues arise when
lawyers negotiate with this sort of assistance, and additional issues
confront the judge and the mediator. Numerous organizations have
undertaken to provide rules or at least guidance concerning these
issues."3 The ABA Litigation Section Task Force on ethical issues in
settlement negotiations originally included a section in the guidelines on
assisted settlement. The task force decided to eliminate that section.
Nevertheless, the issues are sufficiently important that a portion of this
Symposium was dedicated to them. The panel54 discussed five issues:
(1) what the lawyer should do in a mediation when a client reveals
privately that some evidence has been destroyed; (2) whether a lawyer
should enlist a judge's assistance with a difficult client; (3) whether a
mediator should give legal advice to one party; (4) whether it is proper
for a mediator to give different evaluations of a case in caucus sessions
in an attempt to reach a settlement; and (5) whether a mediator should
report professional misconduct of a lawyer that is discovered in a
mediation session.
A.

Destruction of Evidence

The first hypothetical dealt with the lawyer's duties toward the
mediator. In this hypothetical, assume that there is an outstanding
disclosure or discovery obligation that would cover the evidence at issue:

53.

For the most recent example, see the February 2001 draft of the Uniform Mediation

Act, available on the Internet at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-frame.htm>.
54. The moderator for the final panel of the Symposium was James Elliott, Associate
Dean for External Affairs at Emory University School of Law and a former President of the
State Bar of Georgia. The panelists were the Honorable S. Phillip Brown, Judge of the
Superior Court for the Macon Circuit (Georgia), Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky, Clinical

Professor of Law and the Executive Director of the Jacob Burns Ethics Center at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York, and Ronald Jay Cohen, the founding
partner of the Cohen Kennedy Dowd & Quigley firm in Phoenix and current chair of the
ABA Litigation Section.
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You have spent the morning mediating an age discrimination case.
Over lunch, your client tells you, for the first time, that he "deleted"
several e-mails from the company's system. These e-mails described
the plaintiff as a "geezer" who "had to go." Your client forbids you to
disclose the existence of this evidence to the mediator or the opposing
party. May you return to the negotiations and settle the case without
disclosing the e-mails?
The lawyer's options appear to be to return to the negotiation and try to
settle the case, to try to adjourn the mediation long enough to decide
what to do, or to disclose the evidence to the opposing party before
consummating a settlement.
The lawyer has at least two ethical problems. First, the lawyer is not
complying with his or her obligation to provide appropriate discovery
under Rule 3.4(d), which states, "A lawyer shall not ... in pretrial
procedure . .. fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a
legally proper discovery request by an opposing party." Second, the
lawyer who completes the settlement without disclosing the evidence is
participating in a fraud on the other party, who has every right to rely
upon the completeness of discovery responses in negotiating a settlement.55 The client may exacerbate the lawyer's problems by invoking
Rule 1.6 and refusing to permit him or her to reveal the evidence or
disclose anything about it to the opposing party. The lawyer's only
option at that point is to seek to withdraw to avoid assisting in the
fraud. The lawyer's problem can become worse. The mediator is not a
judge but is acting in a neutral capacity, usually by appointment from
the court. If the mediator is a "tribunal" within the meaning of Rule 3.3,
the lawyer has a duty to disclose the missing evidence to the mediator,
and this obligation supercedes any duty of confidentiality under Rule
1.6.56 The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission has adopted the view that a
mediator is not a tribunal under Rule 3.3.57

55. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (duty to supplement disclosures "at appropriate intervals"
and discovery "seasonably").
56. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(2) states: "Alawyer shall not... fail to
disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client.... ." Rule 3.3(b) states that the "duties stated in
paragraph (a) ... apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise

protected by Rule 1.6."
57. Comment 5 to new proposed Rule 2.4 states,
Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are
governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution
process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(m)),
the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty
of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by
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The ideal result would be to convince the client to reveal the evidence
that was "deleted." It is possible that the evidence is not, in context, as
bad as it sounds. Even if it is, a settlement that is driven by the truth,
and the finality that comes with this sort of settlement, is preferable to
the alternatives. A settlement negotiated under the status quo would be
a fraud, and the fraud would give rise not only to a right to rescind the
settlement but also could be a basis for independent liability. Starting
over with a new lawyer, if the current one withdraws, would be
expensive and suspicious. The lawyer and the client are both better off
if the client can be convinced to do the right thing.
The RecalcitrantClient
The next issue concerns a special type of assisted settlement, the
judicial settlement conference.5" One common reason why assistance
in settlement is necessary is that a party may have unrealistic
expectations abut the possible outcome of the case. Sometimes the
lawyer cannot reason with the client. Indeed, sometimes it is the lawyer
who creates those expectations at the beginning of a case. This creates
a problem for the lawyer:
B.

You represent a plaintiff in a breach of contract case. Your client has
rejected your advice to accept the defendant's settlement offer. You
believe the client is being unreasonable. May you enlist the assistance
of the judge in an upcoming settlement conference to "talk some sense"
to your client?

The propriety of this step has provoked vigorous disagreement.59 No
one can doubt that the technique is likely to be effective.6 ° The judge
in a settlement conference has enormous prestige and, if the judge will
also be the trial judge, a vast reservoir of discretionary power. The
technique also is commonly used."' Opponents of this strategy object
on two bases. First, the lawyer in some sense is selling out the client.
The judge learns from the person who is supposed to be the client's

Rule 4.1.
58. For a classic discussion of this topic, see Hubert L. Will et al., The Role of the Judge
in the Settlement Process (1983).
59. When this hypothetical was presented at the 2001 Winter Meeting of the ABA
Litigation Section leadership, it sparked the most heated discussion of the day.
60. See Patrick E. Longan, BureaucraticJustice Meets ADR: The Emerging Role for
Magistrates as Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REv. 712, 734 (1994).

61. Judge Brown in the symposium commented that he has had many of these
conversations. Several lawyers in the discussion at the ABA Litigation Section Winter

Leadership meeting stated that they routinely go to the court when they are having trouble
with a client.
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champion that the client really is an unreasonable fool. This is a
disloyal act. Second, the lawyer inevitably reveals information gathered
in the course of the representation, namely that the client is an
unreasonable fool. It is hard to imagine that the client gives permission
for this communication. Without permission, talking to the judge
violates Rule 1.6.
The need to enlist the judge usually reflects a failure by the lawyer.
The lawyer, by word and deed, should inspire the client's trust and
loyalty from the beginning of the relationship. A lawyer who does so will
be able to persuade most clients to accept reasonable settlements
without having to use the judge to reason with them. Sometimes,
however, someone in addition to the lawyer will need to "talk some
sense" to the client. Some clients really are unreasonable fools. That
other person could be a family member, a friend, another lawyer, or a
mediator. Before asking the judge to do it, however, the lawyer needs
to seek the client's permission to avoid the appearance of disloyalty and
the reality of a breach of confidentiality.
C. Legal Advice and the Mediator
The third hypothetical
raised a fundamental issues about the role of
2
the mediator:
You are the mediator in a personal injury case. You realize after
talking with the plaintiff's lawyer that the lawyer has negligently
failed to include a cause of action. The value of the case would change
dramatically if this claim was added. May you, and should you, advise
the plaintiff's lawyer of your observation?
The mediator above all else is supposed to be neutral.' The Ethics
2000 Commission has proposed a new rule about the conduct of lawyers
acting as third-party neutrals.' A mediator may not be seen as neutral

62. For a useful discussion of the issues raised by this hypothetical, see Diane K
Vescovo, Allen S. Blair, and Hayden D. Lait, Ethical Issues in Mediation, 31 Memphis L.
Rev. 59, 73-77 (2000).
63. Consider the following from the influential set of standards jointly adopted by the
American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association, and the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution [hereinafter the ABA/AAA/SPIDR Standards]:
The concept of mediator impartiality is central to the mediation process. A
mediator shall mediate only those matters in which she or he can remain
impartial and evenhanded. If at any time the mediator is unable to conduct the
process in an impartial manner, the mediator is obligated to withdraw.
ABA/AAAISPIDR Standard II, available on the Internet at <http://www.to-agree.com/
spidrstd.htm>.
64. Ethics 2000 Commission, proposed new rule 2.4 (emphasis added).
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if he or she is giving legal assistance to one party at the expense of
another. He or she may be seen as an advocate. For this reason, giving
legal advice to one side is strongly discouraged.6" However, some
mediators believe that, as a neutral, they have a duty to help the parties
reach a fair settlement, not just to assist in reaching any settlement. An
agreement in which the plaintiff receives less in settlement than he or
she would receive if the lawyer was doing a good job is not a fair
settlement.
In the end, the point may be largely academic. The setting and the
phrasing of the conversation with the plaintiff's lawyer may insulate the
mediator from criticism. This conversation will almost certainly happen
in a caucus with the plaintiff and the plaintiff's lawyer, out of the
hearing of the defense. Unless the applicable mediation standards forbid
doing so, the mediator can put the information in play with a question,
such as "why did you choose not to assert this cause of action?"6 When
the plaintiff's lawyer recovers his or her senses enough to say that he or
she may seek to amend to add the claim, the mediator can go to the
defense and, with permission, relate the plaintiff's intention to expand
the case. The missing cause of action will then be factored into the
settlement, without the mediator having to advise the plaintiff's lawyer
to add it and without the defense knowing, at least with certainty, the
origin of the threat to amend.
In this hypothetical, the problem arises because the mediator is
concerned so much with fairness that he or she might overstep his or her
role as a neutral. In the next Section, the problem arises because the
mediator becomes so concerned with achieving any settlement, even an
unjust one, that he or she manipulates the parties and their lawyers.

65. The ABA/AAA/SPIDR comments to Standards VI state:
The primary purpose of a mediator is to facilitate the parties' voluntary
agreement. This role differs substantially from other professional-client
relationships. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of a professional advising

a client is problematic, and mediators must strive to distinguish between the
roles. A mediator should, therefore, refrain from providing professional advice.
Where appropriate, a mediator should recommend that parties seek outside
professional advice, or consider resolving their dispute through arbitration,
counseling, neutral evaluation, or other processes.
ABA/AAA/SPIDR Standards, supra note 63.
66. ABA/AAA/SPIDR comments to Standard I permit the mediator to "provide
information about the process, raise issues, and help parties explore options." In Florida,
raising issues in this way is not permitted. See Vescovo, et al., supra note 62, at 77.
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D. The Manipulative Mediator
Good mediators can promote settlement by suggesting alternatives the
parties have not considered, by providing a neutral forum where parties
can tell their stories, and by helping lawyers overcome communication
problems with each other or their clients. The hypothetical before the
panel, however, dealt with a different situation, one in which the
mediator evaluates the case, but evaluates it differently for each side in
private caucus sessions:
You are the mediator in a personal injury case in which the plaintiff
will make a sympathetic witness but will face significant, but not
necessarily insurmountable, legal barriers to recovery. In the caucus
sessions, may you emphasize the legal obstacles to the plaintiff and the
sympathies to the defendant?
Few doubt that some mediators use this technique. But is it legitimate?
It depends. The mediator might truthfully explain to each side the
strengths and weaknesses of its case. By doing so, the experienced
mediator helps the lawyers predict the likely outcome of trial and
thereby come to a better assessment of the settlement value of a case.
There is a substantial risk, however, especially in caucus sessions when
the behavior could go undetected, that a mediator who is determined to
settle a case could manipulate the weaker or less experienced lawyer at
the expense of that lawyer's client.67 It is one thing for an adversary
to affect the result by better lawyering. That is an inescapable part of
an adversarial system. It is another for a court-appointed intermediary
to exploit the ineptitude or inexperience of one counsel. We would not
praise a judge who detected weakness on one side of a case and rammed
through a settlement, indifferent to the fairness of the outcome. The
mediator acts as an adjunct to the court. We should expect the mediator
to have enough scruples not to seek a settlement, any settlement, just
because he or she can. Mediators are not supposed to concern themselves with their "batting averages."68
E. Reporting Misconduct
Finally, the lawyer mediator may have to deal with the same
difficulties about reporting professional misconduct as advocates do:

67. See generally Longan, supra note 60, at 726-30.
68. Under ABA/AAA/SPIDR Standard VI, "Mediators should not permit their behavior
in the mediation process to be guided by a desire for a high settlement rate."
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As the mediator of a complex business case, you learn that one of the
lawyers has a conflict of interest. The lawyer refuses to divulge the
conflict to his or her client or the court. May you, and should you,
report this conduct to the court?
The conflict for the mediator is one between his or her recognized duty
as a lawyer to report professional misconduct69 and the super-imposed
duty as a mediator to keep confidential information learned in mediation.7"

The hypothetical is based on the case of In re Waller,"' in which a
mediator reported to a court that a lawyer had revealed a conflict of
interest during a mediation. The court was not troubled by the
That result is not inevitable,
mediator's breach of confidentiality.
however. The situation is analogous to the conflict between Rule 8.3's
duty to report misconduct and Rule 1.6's duty to keep information
learned in the course of the representation confidential. In that more
familiar context, the Rules make it clear that the lawyer may not report
the other lawyer's misconduct if that information is covered by Rule 1.6,
if the client objects." The duty of self-regulation of the profession gives
way to the duty of confidentiality.
In the mediation context, a similar resolution is foreseeable.
Successful mediation depends upon the parties' faith that the mediator
will report nothing to the court except whether or not there has been a
settlement. If the parties and lawyers begin to pull punches for fear of
the mediator reporting them, a mediated settlement becomes less likely.
Mediation has become an accepted and important part of disposing of
civil litigation. Just as the principle of self-regulation gives way to the
need to respect client confidentiality, the need for confidentiality in
mediation may supercede the reporting requirement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Symposium on ethics in settlement negotiations was intended to
assist the ABA Litigation Section in the drafting of its Guidelines. As
you will see in the pages that follow, the panelists and the audience

69. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a).

70. For example, a comment to ABA/AAA/SPIDR Standard V states that, "[i]n order to
protect the integrity of the mediation, a mediator should avoid communicating information
about how the parties acted in the mediation process, the merits of the case, or settlement
offers. The mediator may report, if required, whether parties appeared at a scheduled
mediation."
71. 573 A.2d 780 (D.C. 1990).
72. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3, cmt. 2 (1999).
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members engaged in a stimulating, and sometimes heated, discussion
about what the lawyers in these hypothetical cases should do. They
helped all those who were present to see the issues and understand
better how they might be resolved by lawyers who aspire to represent
their clients well and still obey the ethical limits of our profession. With
the publication of this transcript and the other materials in this issue of
the Mercer Law Review, we hope that the readers will benefit from the
discussion just as the participants did. If so, then the spirit as well as
the letter of Judge Lawson's order, which funded the Symposium, will
have been fulfilled.

*

*
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